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Abstract 
Survey information on Swiss exporters is used to test the hypothesis that firm-specific 
factors, in particular firm size, are important determinants of pricing--to-market (PTM). The 
survey asked exporters whether they set different prices across markets and, if so, whether 
price segmentation occurred because of pricing conditions in the local market or other 
factors. The empirical analysis is based on a probit model that regresses a binary-choice 
variable of PTM on firm size and other control variables. The main empirical finding is that 
firm size and PTM are positively and significantly correlated. A further result is that while 
firms whose main export market is in the Euro area are less likely to engage in PTM, firm 
size plays a bigger role for them. These results are robust across different PTM 
classifications, regression specifications, export destinations, and industrial sectors. 
Keywords 
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F10, F14 1 Introduction
Do ￿rm-speci￿c factors explain why some companies price-discriminate across
export markets and others do not? Two decades of micro-based theoretical
research in international macroeconomics have shown that our thinking on
crucial issues like the desirability of ￿xed versus ￿ exible exchange rates can be
strongly in￿ uenced by speci￿c assumptions about the price-setting behavior
of ￿rms.1 Traditional empirical research, however, has primarily emphasized
country- and sector-speci￿c factors to explain international price discrimina-
tion (Goldberg and Knetter 1997). This paper, in contrast, reports on the
importance of ￿rm size.
There are several reasons why large exporters are more likely to set dif-
ferent prices in di⁄erent markets than small exporters.2 First, large exporters
tend to sell to more markets, whereas small ￿rms frequently concentrate on
a single market or buyer.3 The more markets a ￿rm supplies, the greater
is the likelihood that there is at least one market with su¢ ciently distinct
characteristics to induce the ￿rm to charge a market-speci￿c price di⁄er-
ent from that in other markets. Second, large exporters are more likely to
have su¢ cient market power to set prices. Third, larger exporting ￿rms are
more likely to bear the transaction costs associated with international price
discrimination. Such costs are not usually addressed in the theoretical lit-
1Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2000), Engel (2000) and Devereux and Engel (2003) are just a
few examples.
2These are also linked with Varian￿ s (1989) necessary conditions for price discrimi-
nation to be a solution to the ￿rm￿ s maximization problem: (i) sorting of customers, (ii)
prevention of resale, and (iii) the presence of market power.
3Eaton et al. (2004), for instance, show that in a sample of French manufacturing ￿rms
more than a third export to one market only. Counting only those ￿rms that export at
all, more than 60% export to one market only.
3erature, but matter in practice, since international price discrimination re-
quires detailed knowledge of local market conditions. Moreover, by investing
in market-speci￿c branding and marketing, ￿rms can in￿ uence the degree of
market segmentation (Friberg, 2001), which itself is a precondition for price
discrimination. Since the investment in both information gathering and seg-
mentation is largely independent of sales volumes and thus more like a ￿xed
than a variable cost, larger ￿rms will be more frequently willing to undertake
it.4
To test the hypothesis that ￿rm-speci￿c factors, in particular ￿rm size, are
important determinants of international price discrimination, we use cross-
sectional information from a recent survey of Swiss exporters. While there
are a handful of studies that address questions related to international price
segmentation on the basis of survey data, little emphasis has been placed
on ￿rm size.5 The Swiss survey asked exporters whether they set di⁄erent
prices across their export markets and, if so, whether price segmentation oc-
curred because of pricing conditions in the local market or other factors. The
econometric analysis of their responses presented in this paper uses a probit
model to regress a binary-choice variable of international price discrimina-
tion on ￿rm size and other control variables. As in the original literature on
international price discrimination (e.g. Krugman 1987), we refer to this phe-
4A related ￿ stylized fact￿that has sometimes been attributed to transaction costs is
the positive correlation between ￿rm size and export intensity (see Avenir Suisse 2005 for
evidence on this correlation for Switzerland). Several recent contributions, however, suggest
that this relationship may be driven by other ￿rm-speci￿c factors (see, e.g., Verwaal and
Donkers 2002; Wagner 2003 and Kalafsky 2004).
5See Friberg and Wilander (2007) and the studies listed in Fabiani et al. (2007).
One exception is L￿nnemann and Math￿ (2006, Table 5) who show that, in the case of
Luxembourg, larger ￿rms set di⁄erent prices across countries more frequently than smaller
￿rms, but this result is not tested econometrically.
4nomenon as pricing-to-markets (PTM). In principle, this is compatible with
both producer- and local-currency pricing (PCP and LCP, respectively).
2 Data and PTM Variables
Information on the pricing behavior of Swiss exporters is taken from the
2006 Survey on Export Pricing conducted by the KOF Swiss Economic In-
stitute at the request of the Swiss National Bank. This one-o⁄questionnaire
on export pricing was distributed as part of the regular quarterly KOF Eco-
nomic Barometer surveys.6 In addition to price segmentation, the survey
asked questions on export destination, market share, type of buyer and cur-
rency invoicing. The survey was sent to 1421 ￿rms in industry, services (hotel
and restaurant) and the ￿nancial sector, located throughout Switzerland in
August 2006. In this paper, we focus solely on the 826 ￿rms in the industrial
sector included in the survey. Among these industrial ￿rms, 543 responded,
corresponding to a response rate of 65.7%.
The construction of the binary choice variable for PTM is based on two
questions in the survey. The ￿rst asks: If your ￿rm￿ s main export product in
2005 was delivered to di⁄erent export destinations, did the price measured
in CHF di⁄er between these markets? Of the 531 valid responses from in-
dustrial ￿rms to this question (i.e., 12 of the 543 did not respond to this
question), 50.5% answered a¢ rmatively.7 This ￿gure is practically identical
to that found for the four countries where the same question was asked in
6The survey is based on a random sample, strati￿ed by ￿rm size and sectors. The
questionnaire on export pricing was only sent to those ￿rms that actually export.
7Note that the question refered to the price received by the exporting ￿rm. Depending
on who the product was sold to, it could be a price at the border or a consumer price.
5the recent Euro-area price-setting surveys (Fabiani et al. 2006). If the survey
respondent answered yes, a second question sought to identify whether price
segmentation resulted from di⁄erences in costs or pricing conditions across
national markets. The exporters were asked to state whether the following
factors were either very important, somewhat important, or unimportant in
explaining price di⁄erences across export markets: exchange rate ￿ uctuations,
transport costs, local costs (i.e., for product adaptation, marketing, import
duties, regulation, taxes etc.), prices of competitors, copyright and/or patent
protection, buyer preferences, and income di⁄erences.
Table 1 presents the responses to the second question on price segmen-
tation. The most important reason for price di⁄erences across markets was
￿ prices of competitors￿ . The next most frequently cited reasons were buyer
preferences, transport costs, exchange rate ￿ uctuations and local costs, which
at least 20% of ￿rms deemed to be very important. Few ￿rms cited patents
and income di⁄erences as very important.8 This indicates that the standard
textbook model of price discrimination where ￿rms discriminate between dif-
ferent income groups is not particularly relevant in this dataset.
The survey also asked ￿rms to indicate in which currrencies they invoiced
their customers in their main export market. While the invoicing currency
does not necessarily have to correspond to the price-setting currency, em-
pirical evidence suggests that the two are usually the same (Friberg and
Wilander 2006). Interestingly, 52% of the ￿rms in our sample indicated that
they used a mix of LCP and PCP in their main export market. Of the rest,
8￿ Prices of competitors￿was also the most important reason for price di⁄erences in the
Euro-area price-setting surveys (Fabiani et al. 2006).
628.4% were pure LCP setters and 16.6% pure PCP setters.9 Price di⁄erences
across export markets are thus not just limited to LCP ￿rms.10
We use two de￿nitions of PTM to construct our binary PTM variable. The
￿rst, PTM-1, narrowly includes only those ￿rms that cited ￿ prices of com-
petitors￿as ￿ very important￿ . The second de￿nition, PTM-2, is somewhat
wider and includes all those ￿rms that considered either ￿ prices of competi-
tors￿ , ￿ exchange rate ￿ uctuations￿ , ￿ buyer preferences￿or ￿ income di⁄erences￿
as ￿ very important￿ . As a result, 190 ￿rms are classi￿ed as PTM-1 and 220
as PTM-2, out of a total of 531. In the next section, both variables are re-
gressed on ￿rm-speci￿c factors and other control variables to determine the
relationship between ￿rm structure and PTM.11
3 Empirical Results
To determine if PTM is coincident with ￿rm size, we regress the following
probit speci￿cation:
Pr(PTM = 1 j x) = ￿(x
0￿); (1)
9The remainder invoiced in vehicle currencies. Note that the survey questions were
speci￿cally addressed at the main export market. We thus do not have information on
whether the prevalence of dual pricing behavior (i.e., PCP and LCP), strict PCP vs. LCP
or of vehicle currencies applies to other export markets.
10Focusing strictly on LCP ￿rms would have also meant dropping more than two-thirds
of the sample observations.
11We also performed our estimation with an even wider categorization, by classifying
all ￿rms that price-segment as PTM. This yielded qualitatively similar results to those
presented here.
7where the dependent variable, PTM, is +1 if ￿rm i price discriminates
between markets according to one of our two de￿nitions, 0 otherwise, the
function ￿(:) denotes the standard normal distribution, and x contains the
explanatory variables. Our key explanatory variable is ￿rm size, which is
measured as the log of the number of employees. As additional controls, we
include sectoral dummy variables, export intensity, export market share and
distance from the border. The sectoral dummies take account of unobserv-
able industry-speci￿c di⁄erences in PTM behavior. Export intensity (i.e., the
share of exports in ￿rm revenue) helps us control for the often observed pos-
itive correlation with ￿rm size (see footnote 2). Without it, our measure of
￿rm size might indirectly capture the in￿ uence of export intensity on PTM
behavior. Export market share controls for the degree of market power in
the destination market.12 Distance from the border is included since ￿rms
closer to the border might ￿nd it easier to collect the information necessary
for PTM. Equation (1) should not be interpreted as a structural equation.
Rather, we are interested in the coincidence between ￿rm size and PTM, in
particular whether larger ￿rms are more likely to price their products to the
local market than smaller ￿rms.
Table 2 presents four pairs of regression results. Each pair relates to the
same speci￿cation but for the two alternative PTM classi￿cations. The ￿rst
pair, presented in columns (1.1) and (1.2), shows the results of a simple re-
gression between PTM and ￿rm size. The second pair, in columns (2.1) and
12Both, export intensity and export market share are based on categorical data. Export
intensity is provided by KOF as a three-way categorical measure (exports relative to sales
revenue of <33%, 34-66% and >66%). Export market share comes directly from the survey:
￿rms were asked to place their ￿rm￿ s share in one of ￿ve categories (<1%, 1-5%, 6-25%,
26-50%, and >50%).
8(2.2), contains the additional control variables. In each of these four regres-
sions, the coe¢ cient on ￿rm size is positive and signi￿cant at the 5% critical
level. Export intensity and distance to the border have the expected sign,
but are mostly insigni￿cant. Export market share and the sectoral dummies
(not shown) are not signi￿cant in any of our speci￿cations.13
To determine if our results are driven by ￿rms in particular sectors, we also
divided ￿rm size by its SIC 2-digit industrial classi￿cation, and performed
a likelihood ratio test on the sector-speci￿c coe¢ cients on ￿rm size. The
sectoral classi￿cations are chemistry and plastics (97 observations); metals
(98); machinery (113); electric, electronic, and precision instruments (110);
and other sectors (125). The p-values indicate that the null hypothesis of
equality cannot be rejected at the ￿ve percent level. We therefore interpret
the Swiss evidence in the ￿rst four columns of Table 2 as follows: the positive
coincidence between ￿rm size and PTM is robust across industrial sectors,
our two PTM classi￿cations, and di⁄erent regression speci￿cations.
Next, to control for export destination, we examined whether there are
systematic di⁄erences between ￿rms that listed a country in the Euro area
as their ￿ main export market￿and those that listed other destinations.14 This
data cut takes account of the proposition that PTM behavior is less likely
within a currency union.15 The corresponding results are presented in the
13In other versions of our regression model (not reported here) we also included the
share of exports sold the company group (also part of the export pricing suvey) to capture
posible di⁄erences between arm￿ s-length transactions and trade within multinational ￿rms
(see Hellerstein and Villas-Boas 2006) However, this variable proved to be insigni￿cant
throughout.
14The survey questions related to the ￿rms￿￿ main export market￿only. Nearly 73%
percent of industrial ￿rms in the survey had their main export market in the Euro area.
15Several arguments have been put forth. The European Commission has, for instance,
frequently argued in the run-up to the Euro that a common currency raises transparency
9last four columns of Table 2. Again, columns (3.1) and (3.2) are without
the additional control variables and columns (4.1) and (4.2) include them.
The main result holds: ￿rm size is positively and signi￿cantly correlated with
the likelihood of PTM. The estimated coe¢ cient is more than twice as large
for ￿rms whose main export market is in the Euro area, suggesting that ￿rm
size could be an even more important determinant of PTM within a currency
union, but the di⁄erence is not statistically signi￿cant (see the row labeled
￿ Euro area versus non-Euro area ￿rm size (p-value)￿ ). The Euro-area dummy
has a negative sign, which is in line with the prediction that PTM is ceteris
paribus less prevalent within a currency union, but it is only signi￿cant at
the ten percent level. The other results are similar to those in the ￿rst four
columns of Table 2: the additional control variables have the expected sign
but remain mostly insigni￿cant; the correlation between ￿rm size and PTM
does not vary across sectors; and there is little di⁄erence between the results
for the two PTM classi￿cations.
4 Concluding remarks
The results in this paper show that ￿rm-speci￿c factors explain why some
exporters pursue PTM strategies and others do not. In particular, we ￿nd
a positive relationship between PTM and ￿rm size using survey evidence on
and comparability for consumers. This implies greater arbitrage opportunities and thus
reduces a ￿rm￿ s ability to PTM. Friberg (2001) shows that a common currency lowers
the incentive for ￿rms to invest in the market segmentation necessary for PTM. Devereux
et al. (2003) argue that third-country exporters will tend to view a monetary union as a
single marketing area and therefore charge a common price. Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2005) show that a monetary union will tend to make exporting ￿rms in these countries
invoice in the local currency of a third country.
10Swiss exporters. The correlation is robust across a range of speci￿cations.
We also ￿nd that while ￿rms whose main export market is in the Euro area
are less likely to engage in PTM, ￿rm size plays a bigger role for them.
It is important to note that our evidence on the determinants of PTM
should not be generalized to the degree of exchange rate pass-through (EPT).
PTM is a necessary pre-condition for incomplete EPT, but not a su¢ cient
one (Goldberg and Knetter 1997). However, it is possible that the same
determinants apply to both PTM and EPT. If true, and ￿rm size is also
related to the degree of EPT, then di⁄erences in the distribution of ￿rm size
could be yet another explanation for why EPT appears to both di⁄er across
sectors and markets, and vary over time.
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13Table 1: Why does price segmentation occur?
Very Somewhat Not
important important important
Exchange rate ￿ uctuations 24.8% 47.2% 28.0%
Transport costs 26.2% 50.8% 23.1%
Costs in local market 21.5% 47.0% 31.6%
Prices of competitors 74.5% 21.2% 4.3%
Copyright/patent protection 5.3% 21.0% 73.7%
Buyer preferences 29.0% 45.6% 25.4%
Income di⁄erences 11.3% 31.3% 57.5%
Notes: The table summarizes the responses of the 531 ￿rms in our sample that set di⁄erent
prices across export markets. Multiple answers were permitted.
14Table 2: Probit regressions of PTM on ￿rm size
1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2
PTM classi￿cation PTM-1 PTM-2 PTM-1 PTM-2 PTM-1 PTM-2 PTM-1 PTM-2
Euro area dummy -0.757+ -0.799+ -0.606 -0.652
(0.435) (0.418) (0.451) (0.434)
Firm size (all) 0.238* 0.229* 0.232* 0.217*
(0.045) (0.043) (0.047) (0.046)
Firm size (Euro area) 0.286* 0.274* 0.275* 0.256*
(0.055) (0.053) (0.059) (0.057)
Firm size (non-Euro area) 0.141+ 0.128+ 0.157 0.139+
(0.077) (0.074) (0.078) (0.076)
Export market share -0.065 -0.036 -0.071 -0.046
(0.051) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051)
Export intensity 0.126 0.154+ 0.117 0.144+
(0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080)
Distance to border -0.252 -0.163 -0.246 -0.160
(0.202) (0.192) (0.203) (0.193)
Sectoral dummies (p-value) 0.932 0.796 0.917 0.773
Firm size by sectors (p-value)
all 0.933 0.947 0.461 0.733
Euro area 0.182 0.557 0.187 0.662
non￿ Euro area 0.791 0.726 0.627 0.701
Euro e⁄ect (p-value) 0.191 0.121 0.277 0.816
DOF 516 521 486 490 514 519 484 488
Cases correct 347 320 326 306 352 319 323 305
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.054 0.066 0.064 0.063 0.062 0.070 0.069
Notes: Standard errors (robust) are shown in parentheses. DOF denotes degrees of freedom,
* signi￿cance at the 5% and + signi￿cance at the 10% level. The p-values refer to likelihood
ratio tests. PTM-1 and PTM-2 are the two classi￿cations described in the text. Each
regression also contains a constant term (not shown).
15